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INTRODUCTION 
ike many law professors, I have coached my share of moot court 
teams.  As you probably know, in most competitions students 
either choose or are assigned one side of the case to brief.  But for the 
oral argument segment of the competition, students must argue both 
sides of the case, “on-brief” and “off-brief,” often in alternate rounds. 
At the end of a competition, with their heads still swimming with 
arguments and counterarguments, students will sometimes ask, “OK, 
so can you tell us which is the correct side?”  I always say, “Of course 
I can. . . . The correct side is always the side you are currently 
arguing.” 
Some students see this as a cynical response.  But I remind them 
that a moot court issue is a special category of legal dispute.  The 
reason the issue was chosen for the competition in the first place is 
the perception that there must be two very plausible sides to this 
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issue.  And I always go on to tell them that the lawyer’s job as 
advocate is not to lead the court to some single absolute “truth”; 
rather, it is simply to convince the court why her client’s position is 
more legally and logically correct than the opposing side’s position. 
I thought of this recently when I read about a provocative new idea 
presented by cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber.  
They call it “The Argumentative Theory.”1  After examining this new 
concept, Stephen Pinker said that “[i]t is likely to have a big impact 
on our understanding of ourselves and current affairs.”2  Jonathan 
Haidt has called Mercier and Sperber’s work “one of my favorite 
papers of the last ten years.  I believe that they have solved one of the 
most important . . . puzzles in psychology.”3 
The puzzle is this: why are human beings so good at reasoning in 
some situations and so consistently, hopelessly wrong in others?  
Mercier and Sperber provide an elegant solution: it is because the 
function of human reasoning is not to logically arrive at the “right” 
answer.4  On the contrary, the function of reasoning is to find support 
for an answer that the reasoner has already arrived at.  In other words, 
the function of reasoning is argumentative.  Its role is to create 
arguments intended to persuade.  A skilled arguer is not necessarily 
after the truth; he is after arguments that support the views he already 
possesses so that he may convince others.  Reasoning thus has a 
strongly social function. 
Jonathan Haidt summarized the Mercier and Sperber thesis thusly: 
“[R]easoning was not designed to pursue the truth.  Reasoning was 
designed by evolution to help us win arguments.  That’s why they call 
it the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning.”5  And another 
commentator reduced the thesis to one sentence: “Reasoning isn’t 
about logic (it’s about arguing).”6 
 
1 Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason?  Arguments for an 
Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1698090. 
2 John Brockman, The Argumentative Theory: A Conversation with Hugo Mercier, 
EDGE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://edge.org/conversation.php?cid=the-argumentative-theory. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Jonathan Haidt, Speech at the New Science of Morality: An Edge Conference (July 
20, 2010) (transcript available at http://edge.org/3rd_culture/morality10/morality.haidt 
.html). 
6 Morendil, Reasoning Isn’t About Logic (It’s About Arguing), LESSWRONG (Mar. 14, 
2010, 4:42 AM), http://lesswrong.com/lw/1wu/reasoning_isnt_about_logic_its_about 
_arguing. 
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I 
“THE ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY” 
Mercier and Sperber begin with some basic definitions.  An 
“inference” in psychology is “the production of new mental 
representations on the basis of previously held representations.”7  
Reasoning, on the other hand, is simply a type of inference.  
“Reasoning . . . refers to a very special form of inference at the 
conceptual level, where not only is a new mental representation (or 
conclusion) consciously produced, but the previously held 
representations (or premises) that warrant it are also consciously 
entertained.”8  Thus, in human reasoning, “premises are seen as 
providing reasons to accept the conclusion.”9  Psychologists such as 
Daniel Kahneman have differentiated between the mental 
mechanisms that produce inferences as opposed to those that engage 
in reasoning.  They refer to the parts of the brain that produce 
inferences as “System 1” and to the parts of the brain that produce 
reasoning as “System 2.”10 
A person is not conscious of the inferences produced by System 1; 
the work takes place inside the brain at a “subpersonal” level.  A 
person can be aware that he has reached a conclusion—the output of 
the inferential process—but unaware of the process that produced it.  
According to Mercier and Sperber, “All inferences carried out by 
inferential mechanisms are in this sense intuitive.  They generate 
intuitive beliefs; that is, beliefs held without awareness of reasons to 
hold them.”11 
But aren’t beliefs always supported by reasons?  Some beliefs are, 
but some beliefs are not.  Mercier and Sperber distinguish between 
two types of belief.  System 1 “intuitive beliefs” are created 
unconsciously without reasoning.12  “Reflective beliefs,” however, 
are the product of System 2 conscious reasoning.13  And what 
characterizes this type of reasoning is “awareness not just of a 
conclusion but of an argument that justifies accepting that 
 
7 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 1, at 57. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 58; see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) 
(describing System 1 and System 2 thinking). 
11 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 1, at 58. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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conclusion.”14  Yet “reasoning” does not passively allow “argument” 
to sweep you towards a “conclusion.”  Rather, arguments are outputs 
of intuitive conclusions.  The conclusion comes before the argument.  
Arguments—that is, reasons to accept a conclusion—are driven by 
the already-determined conclusion.15 
But if the conclusions have been unconsciously produced by 
System 1, then why is System 2 “reasoning” even necessary?  
Traditionally, scientists and philosophers have celebrated human 
reasoning as a way to correct mistakes in System 1 intuitions.16  But 
Mercier and Sperber argue that reasoning, properly viewed, is not 
primarily about the reasoner trying to reach conclusions for himself.17  
Rather, the function of reasoning is argumentative.  That is, a person 
uses reasoning to prepare to convince others that the conclusion that 
he has already reached is the correct conclusion.  Reasoning is 
primarily concerned with social communication, not individual truth 
seeking.18 
To take this out of the realm of tautology, Mercier and Sperber 
then attempt to show that certain widely acknowledged flaws in 
reasoning are only flaws if the purpose of reasoning is to reach a 
“correct” result.  Yet they are not flaws at all if the purpose of 
reasoning is merely to win arguments. 
They begin by noting those studies that purport to show that people 
have poor reasoning skills.  Mercier and Sperber concede that these 
experiments show that people generally are not adept at solving 
abstract logical problems.19  Yet their theory insists that abstract 
reasoning—reasoning with nothing real at stake—is not why humans 
use reasoning skills.20  If their theory is correct, then studies should 
show that people are able to make and understand arguments in those 
situations where one person is genuinely trying to convince another 
person of something significant.  And indeed they cite studies 
showing that people are adept at making, understanding, and 




16 Id. at 59. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 61. 
20 Id. 
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For example, Mercier and Sperber cite a study where a participant 
was asked to think about a topic such as “What are the causes of 
school failure?”21  After several minutes, the participant was then 
asked to state and defend his views to the experimenter; significantly, 
the experimenter did not challenge the participant’s views in any way.  
The devisers of the study criticized the subjects for expressing only 
the side they were supporting and failing to think through the issue by 
anticipating counterarguments and rebuttals.  They concluded that the 
arguments exhibited flawed reasoning. 
Yet Mercier and Sperber came to the opposite conclusion.  
According to their “argumentative theory,” if the reasoner’s goal is to 
convince others, the reasoner’s first task is to marshal supporting 
arguments.  The reason the participants did not also produce 
counterarguments is, quite simply, that the experimenter did not 
challenge their views.  Mercier and Sperber then cite other studies 
showing that, when directly challenged, people are quite capable of 
rebutting contrary arguments.22  In fact, these studies show that 
reasoning skills improve when people are challenged in 
argumentative settings.23 
Mercier and Sperber then turn to what is widely regarded as a flaw 
in reasoning: “confirmation bias.”  Confirmation bias is defined as the 
“seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to 
existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”24  
Conventional wisdom holds that confirmation bias places blinders on 
a reasoning person and leads to faulty thinking. 
But Mercier and Sperber refuse to accept this as a flaw.  After 
examining the results of several studies contending that confirmation 
bias is a defect in reasoning,25 Mercier and Sperber draw very 
different conclusions.  They see confirmation bias as occurring only 
when participants are producing arguments in situations in which 
their own claims are being actively challenged.  Rather than a 
reasoning flaw, confirmation bias is merely an argumentative tool 
used to win over doubting opponents.26 
 
21 Id. at 62. 
22 Id. at 62–63. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 63 (quoting R.S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomena in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998)). 
25 Id. at 63–66. 
26 Id. at 64. 
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So, too, with “motivated reasoning,” the tendency of people to 
reject evidence that contradicts their existing beliefs.27  From an 
epistemic viewpoint, it is a flaw in reasoning that will perhaps lead to 
an incorrect result.  But again, through the lens of argumentative 
theory, Mercier and Sperber see this not as a way people convince 
themselves of the truth of their opinions but rather as a tactic to be 
able to meet the challenges of others in an argumentative setting.28 
Mercier and Sperber finally take on the classical view that 
reasoning—the conscious weighing of possible options and the 
consideration of pros and cons—is the proper way to come to the best 
decision.  Of course, recent studies—given prominence by Malcolm 
Gladwell in Blink29—actually indicate that the best decisions are 
often made intuitively in split seconds.30  On the other hand, there is 
evidence that sometimes people who are asked to actually provide 
reasons for a decision they will make may tend to make worse 
decisions.31 
And Mercier and Sperber provide a reason for this: because 
reasoning’s purpose is essentially argumentative, it is geared “not 
towards the best decisions but towards decisions that are easier to 
justify.”32 
Their final conclusion? 
Reasoning can lead to poor outcomes not because humans are bad 
at it but because they systematically look for arguments to justify 
their beliefs or their actions.  The argumentative theory, however, 
puts such well-known demonstrations of “irrationality” in a novel 
perspective.  Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general 
mechanism; it is a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted 
 
27 Id. at 66. 
28 Id. 
29 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 
(2007). 
30 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 1, at 69. 
31 See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: 
Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991).  Wilson and Schooler’s 1991 study asked people to rank the 
quality of different brands of strawberry jam.  People who were simply asked which jams 
were the best tasting produced results consistent with a Consumer Reports study.  
However, when people were asked to provide explicit reasons for their choices, they chose 
Consumer Reports’ worst-rated jam.  Wilson and Schooler opined that “thinking too 
much” makes us focus on all sorts of variables that do not really matter.  The study is also 
discussed in Jonah Lehrer, We Are All Talk Radio Hosts, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2010, 1:03 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/08/we-are-all-talk-radio-hosts. 
32 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 1, at 69. 
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to a certain type of social and cognitive interaction at which it 
excels.33 
II 
“ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY” AND THE LAW: A LESSON FOR JUDGES 
So what can a judge learn from “The Argumentative Theory”? 
Mercier and Sperber have supported their work with an impressive 
amount of empirical evidence based on dozens of studies and 
experiments.  But their basic thesis—that conclusions drive reasoning 
and not vice versa—has also been expressed over the years by a 
number of prominent judges and legal scholars.  Consider this: 
“Judg[ment] begins . . . with a conclusion more or less vaguely 
formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and afterwards 
tries to find premises which will substantiate it.” 34  That was written 
by Jerome Frank in 1930.  Or this: “At the constitutional level where 
we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional.  The rational 
part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.”35  
That was Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in the 1930s. 
Another example of conclusion-driven reasoning is found in 
Justice William O. Douglas’s story about the work habits of Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.  Douglas said that Stone would write draft 
opinions with blanks after legal points.  He would then tell his clerks 
to find case precedent to support the points.36  In the same vein, Laura 
Kalman’s biography of Abe Fortas relates a story from a former 
Fortas clerk.  Fortas once dropped a draft opinion on the clerk’s desk 
with this curt direction: “Decorate it.”37  The clerk interpreted this to 
mean that he was to find case citations to support the legal 
conclusions Fortas had already reached.38 
More recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy described judging in this 
way: “You know, all of us have an instinctive judgment that we make. 
. . . But, after you make a judgment, you then must formulate the 
 
33 Id. at 72. 
34 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930). 
35 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 8 (1980). 
36 Id. at 171. 
37 LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 271–72 (1990). 
38 Id. 
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reason for your judgment into a verbal phrase, into a verbal 
formula.”39 
Judge Richard Posner has described the docket of the U.S. 
Supreme Court as being “dominated by cases in which the 
conventional sources of legal authority, such as pellucid constitutional 
text or binding precedent . . . do not speak in a clear voice.”40  If the 
correct decision were clear, the Supreme Court would not have 
granted review.41  Thus, according to Posner, 
[I]t is rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court 
constitutional decision that it was decided correctly or incorrectly.  
When one uses terms like “correct” and “incorrect” in this context, 
all one can actually mean is that one likes (approves of, agrees with, 
or is comfortable with) the decision in question or dislikes 
(disapproves of, disagrees with, or is uncomfortable with) it.42 
Thus, according to Posner, “From a practical standpoint, 
constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court is also the exercise 
of discretion—and that is about all it is.”43 
Stanley Fish has described the way judges work by distinguishing 
between “using” theory and “making use” of theory.44  Fish argues 
that no one in any practice, much less law, “uses” theory in the sense 
of consciously following a set of rules in order to get to a result.  
Rather, a judge “makes use” of theory to convince the legal 
community that her ruling is not merely based on personal whim or 
caprice.  “Using theory” in this way enables the judge to show that 
her ruling is “the inevitable production of a principled and consistent 
history.”45  It enables the judge to claim that her decision is “more or 
less dictated by the inexorable laws of the judicial process.”46 
 
39 Interview by the Academy of Achievement with Anthony Kennedy, Supreme Court 
Justice, in New York City, N.Y. (June 3, 2005) (transcript available at http://www 
.achievement.org/autodoc/page/ken0int-1); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The 
Arrogance of Justice Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 16, 19 (quoting 
the Academy of Achievement interview). 
40 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 42–43 (2005).  Material from this article is incorporated into 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–323 (2008). 
41 Posner, supra note 40, at 43. 
42 Id. at 40. 
43 Id. at 41. 
44 Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987). 
45 Id. at 1791. 
46 Id. at 1793. 
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Thus, Mercier and Sperber’s work provides some solid empirical 
support for a position that has been articulated by some of the most 
astute legal theorists and judges of the last century.  Reasoning—or, 
in Fish’s terminology, the use of theory—is used not as a vehicle to 
discover truth but rather as a way of convincing others that we have 
already discovered it. 
But here is the irony.  At the very time Mercier and Sperber are 
actually providing empirical support for this position taken intuitively 
by some of the best legal minds of the twentieth century, several of 
America’s most prominent lawyers and judges are now denying its 
validity.  For example, take a look at Sonia Sotomayor’s testimony 
during her Supreme Court confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 2009.  Here is her exchange with Senator 
John Kyl (R–AZ): 
KYL: Let me ask you about what [President Obama] said—and I 
talked about in my opening statement whether you agree with him.  
He used two different analogies.  He talked once about the first 25 
miles of a 26-mile marathon, and then he also said in 95 percent of 
the cases the law will give you the answer and the last 5 percent 
legal process will not lead you to the rule of decision.  The critical 
ingredient in those cases is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.  
Do you agree with him that the law only takes you the first 25 miles 
of a marathon and that that last mile has to be decided by what’s in 
the judge’s heart? 
SOTOMAYOR: No, sir.  That’s—I don’t—wouldn’t approach the 
issue of judging in the way the president does.  He has to explain 
what he meant by judging.  I can only explain what I think judges 
should do, which is judges can’t rely on what’s in their heart.  They 
don’t determine the law. Congress makes the laws.  The job of a 
judge is to apply the law.  And so it’s not the heart that compels 
conclusions in cases, it’s the law. 
KYL: And— 
SOTOMAYOR: The judge applies the law to the facts before that 
judge.47 
Later that day, Professor Louis Michael Seidman of Georgetown 
blogged the following: 
I was completely disgusted by Judge Sotomayor’s testimony today.  
If she was not perjuring herself, she is intellectually unqualified to 
 
47 Paul Kane, Kagan Sidesteps Empathy Question, Says “It’s Law All the Way Down” 
WASH. POST, June 29, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010 
/06/29/AR2010062903935.html (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s July 14, 2009, confirmation 
hearing). 
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be on the Supreme Court.  If she was perjuring herself, she is 
morally unqualified.  How could someone who has been on the 
bench for seventeen years possibly believe that judging in hard 
cases involves no more than applying the law to the facts? . . .  To 
claim otherwise—to claim that fidelity to uncontested legal 
principles dictates results—is to claim that whenever Justices 
disagree among themselves, someone is either a fool or acting in 
bad faith.  What does it say about our legal system that in order to 
get confirmed Judge Sotomayor must tell the lies that she told 
today?  That judges and [J]ustices must live these lies throughout 
their professional carers [sic]?48 
Almost a year to the day later, Senator Kyl asked Elena Kagan, yet 
another Obama Supreme Court nominee appearing at her 
confirmation hearing, the same question about whether she agreed 
with President Obama’s marathon analogy and about the need for a 
judge to have heart and empathy.  Here is her response: 
Senator Kyl, I think it’s law all the way down. . . . [T]he question is 
what the law requires. . . . And people can disagree about how . . . 
they apply [law] to a case.  But it’s law all the way down, 
regardless. . . . I don’t know what the president was speaking about 
specifically. . . . But at the end of the day what the judge does is to 
apply the law.  And as I said, it might be hard sometimes to figure 
out what the law requires in any given case, but it’s law all the way 
down.49 
Mercifully for Justice Kagan, Professor Seidman did not comment 
on her testimony.  But both Sotomayor and Kagan won confirmation 
to a Supreme Court whose current Chief Justice, John Roberts, 
analogizes judging to no more than objective baseball umpiring.50 
So why this lack of sophistication from people who are currently 
our nation’s top judges?  Why do these judges insist that a complex 
legal question is amenable to an objectively “correct” answer?  Robin 
West has recently suggested that it may be in response to a general 
perception of the “radical indeterminacy” of law.51  And she contends 
that “[r]adical legal indeterminacy is no longer the view of outliers; it 
 
48 Louis Michael Seidman, Comment to The Federalist Society Online Debate Series: 
The Sotomayor Nomination, Part II, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (July 13, 2009), http://www.fed   
-soc.org/debates/dbtid.30/default.asp. 
49 Kane, supra note 47. 
50 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t 
make the rules, they apply them.”). 
51 Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, NOMOS (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885079 (manuscript at 43). 
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is, rather, a widely shared conventional wisdom.”52  So in response 
we see a “craving for certainty in the face of a presumed 
indeterminacy that underscores a good bit of both law and legal 
writing.”53 
The faith that Sotomayor, Kagan, and Roberts purportedly have in 
the ability of legal reasoning to reach an objectively correct answer 
thus runs headlong into Mercier and Sperber’s cautionary conclusions 
concerning the limits of reasoning in general.  At the very time 
psychologists are preaching humility in our abilities to discover truth, 
Supreme Court Justices seem naively optimistic that simply using 
“law all the way down” will lead to the one correct answer. 
And the irony is this: the more an appellate court opinion uses 
conventional legal reasoning to demonstrate that a close legal 
question is amenable to only one possible answer, the more the losing 
party tends to question the fairness of the court’s decision.  Dan 
Kahan has expressed this phenomenon thusly: “The Court engages in 
reasoned elaboration of its decisions to promote confidence in its 
impartiality.  But far from easing public anxiety, the doctrines, rules, 
and procedures that the Court uses to try to assure us of its neutrality 
only intensify the polarizing effect.”54 
Why is this true? 
First, Kahan looks at the influence of both psychology and judicial 
craft norms on opinion style.  He begins by noting that “[j]udicial 
opinions are notoriously—even comically—unequivocal.  It is rare 
for opinions to acknowledge that an issue is difficult, much less that 
there are strong arguments on both sides.”55  As for the psychological 
reason, Kahan anticipates Mercier and Sperber by noting the tendency 
of people to emphasize evidence favorable to their positions and to 
downplay evidence that is not.56  As for the craft norm, Kahan notes 
that “[j]udges . . . are likely to believe that frankly acknowledging the 
vulnerability of their reasoning to counterarguments will invite the 





54 Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
58 (2011). 
55 Id. at 59. 
56 Id. at 60 (discussing the concept of “coherence-based reasoning”). 
57 Id. 
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Yet Kahan argues that exactly the opposite is true.  When two sides 
are divided on an issue they both care about, a profession of certainty 
from one side actually increases, rather than shrinks, the conflict 
between the two groups.  Kahan cites studies showing that within a 
group that agrees on one side of an issue, there is a dynamic that tends 
to stifle doubts and uncertainties.58  Thus, the group’s public 
pronouncements will actually appear to be more single-minded and 
extreme than the views of individual members of the group really are. 
And how do people on the opposing side view this expression of 
absolute certainty?  They react by becoming even more convinced 
that their opponents must be “either deluded, dishonest, or both.”59  
And, of course, “part of the evidence that the other side must be 
blinded by partisanship is just how uniformly and strongly one’s 
peers reject the other side’s view of the matter.”60  So that side, in 
turn, increases its own professed certainty and the cycle begins again. 
The result is what Kahan calls “exaggerated certitude in judicial 
opinion writing.”61  This dynamic is reminiscent of the old joke about 
the doctor telling the patient, “I have some bad news.  You have six 
months to live.”  When the patient responds, “I’d like a second 
opinion,” the doctor says, “OK, I think you’re ugly, too.”  When a 
judicial opinion—especially a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion 
in a five-to-four case—is couched in completely unequivocal 
language, its message to the other side is: “You’re wrong.  And, by 
the way, you are stupid and perhaps dishonest, too.” 
What Mercier and Sperber’s work should make an appellate judge 
appreciate is that the reasoning skills she uses so adroitly are geared 
not to discover absolute truths but rather to convince others of the 
wisdom of her own position.  This insight should promote at least a 
degree of humility in a judge’s belief that she alone possesses the 
truth. 
So is there any specific recommendation concerning how a judge 
should write an opinion?  Kahan recommends that judges should 
cultivate the quality of aporia in their opinions.62  Kahan defines 
aporia as a “mode of philosophical or argumentative engagement” 
that recognizes “an inescapable (perhaps tragic) difficulty . . . of the 
 
58 Id. at 60–61. 
59 Id. at 61. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 62. 
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problem or phenomenon under investigation.”63  It acknowledges “the 
limited amenability of the problem [itself] to a satisfactory 
solution.”64  Kahan stresses that an aporetic approach does not 
preclude a judge from reaching a definitive outcome or resolution.  
“But it necessarily treats as false—a sign of misunderstanding—any 
resolution of the problem that purports to be unproblematic.”65  And 
Kahan cites studies suggesting that an aporetic approach may indeed 
“reduce the culturally polarizing effects of opinions in constitutional 
law.”66 
At this point, a judge might fairly ask “OK, so reasoning is 
basically a rhetorical tool.  But is reasoning totally self-serving? Is 
there any aspect of reasoning that actually helps us arrive at fairer 
decisions?”  On this issue, Hugo Mercier has offered some guidance. 
After studying Mercier and Sperber’s work, Jonah Lehrer rather 
pessimistically concluded that we need to change our metaphors for 
reasoning.67  Lehrer noted that we like to think of our reasoning 
power as enabling us to think like scientists in our quest to find the 
truth.  But Lehrer said that the voice in your head is not a scientist—it 
is actually a talk radio host: “That voice in your head spewing out 
eloquent reasons to do this or do that doesn’t actually know what’s 
going on . . . .  Instead, it only cares about finding reasons that sound 
good . . . . (Put another way, we’re not being rational—we’re 
rationalizing.)”68 
Mercier responded to Lehrer’s comments by saying that his study’s 
findings were not as pessimistic as Lehrer seemed to think.69  Mercier 
said that while people show bias in the production of arguments, 
humans are actually quite adept at evaluating arguments.  This is 
because, in an evolutionary sense, a person is better off being 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 62 n.347. 
65 Id. at 62.  For an example of a judge using an aporetic approach in decision making, 
see Judge Gerard E. Lynch’s opinion in United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 
2011).  The case concerned a heated dispute over who was the proper owner of a Camille 
Pissarro monotype.  Judge Lynch began his opinion by observing, “Unlike in the Judgment 
of Solomon, see 1 Kings 3:16–28, neither party has blinked, and we are therefore in the 
unenviable position of determining who gets the artwork, and who will be left with 
nothing despite a plausible claim of being unfairly required to bear the loss.”  Id. at 86. 
66 Kahan, supra note 54, at 64. 
67 Lehrer, supra note 31. 
68 Id. 
69 Hugo Mercier, Comment to The Reason We Reason, WIRED (May 4, 2011, 3:22 PM), 
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convinced rather than clinging to false beliefs.  “When people are in 
groups and argue about logical, mathematical or factual problems, 
they robustly converge on the best solution.  If the production of 
argument was unable to influence other people, it would be pointless.  
But if listeners were not mostly influenced for their better good, they 
would not be listening.”70 
Mercier then mentioned something that should be of interest to any 
judge on a collegial appellate court: “The evolutionary logic suggests 
that reasoning can lead us towards the truth, if only we reason with 
people who disagree with us to start with.”71 
In other words, the way appellate decisions are theoretically 
reached by panels of judges should be an optimal way of reaching the 
best result.  Ideally, individual judges with conflicting views should 
present them for evaluation by the group.  Their colleagues’ critiques 
may then result in a change of the views of one or more judges. 
Do appellate courts really operate this way?  It is doubtful.  First, 
recall Mercier’s finding that people in groups converge on the best 
answer when they are dealing with “logical, mathematical or factual 
problems.”  A difficult legal issue is arguably a much different 
problem.  As noted above, an individual judge comes to a legal issue 
with values and proclivities that may make him invulnerable to 
argument. 
Second, several recent books about case conferences within the 
U.S. Supreme Court—or at least those conducted by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist—suggest the futility of using the conference as a vehicle 
for changing a Justice’s vote.  Here is how Jeffrey Rosen described 
Rehnquist’s style of presiding at a conference: 
He ran an especially tight ship . . . .  Briskly going around the table  
. . . he refused to let discussion wander.  Some colleagues 
complained that this format discouraged active debate, but 
Rehnquist argued that because most of the [J]ustices had already 
made up their minds, a protracted colloquy would be a waste of 
time.72 





72 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT 
DEFINED AMERICA 195 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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At our conferences on argued cases, he insisted that each of us 
speak only in turn, and he protested additional debate or discussion 
after the first round of comments was completed.  He was equally 
firm in those protests regardless of whether the speaker agreed or 
disagreed with his own views.73 
Perhaps this is a function of the U.S. Supreme Court’s small, 
rarefied docket.  The “hot button” issues the Supreme Court often 
decides—burning the American flag, demonstrating at a veteran’s 
funeral, abortion—may tend to produce hardened views among the 
Justices that are immune to group discussion.  Perhaps this is why 
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the Justices at conference were 
largely impervious to opposing arguments. 
It may be that collegial courts work best when intermediate 
appellate courts consider run-of-the-mine cases where judges do not 
start out with strong emotional proclivities.  Mercier and Sperber 
insist that human reasoning works well in evaluating arguments.  
Relying on a group of judges to evaluate both the arguments of the 
parties, as well as their colleagues’ critiques of these arguments, may 
actually be the best way to achieve the optimal result.  As Mercier 
said, “The evolutionary logic suggests that reasoning can lead us 
towards the truth, if only we reason with people who disagree with us 
to start with.”74 
The lesson an appellate judge could take from Mercier and 
Sperber’s work may be to understand the line between evaluating an 
argument and producing one yourself.  When judges in a collegial 
setting begin producing their own arguments, discussion has probably 
reached a point of diminishing returns. 
III 
“ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY” AND THE LAW: A LESSON FOR MOOT 
COURT PARTICIPANTS (AND LAWYERS) 
So what can our moot court students, who are forced to 
alternatively argue both sides of an issue, learn from Mercier and 
Sperber? 
First, consider Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s insightful article 
entitled In Praise of Moot Court—Not!75  Chief Judge Kozinski 
criticizes the practice of having moot court participants argue both 
 
73 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 171 (2011). 
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75 Alex Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court—Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1997). 
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sides of an issue in alternating rounds.  He contends that not only is 
this unrealistic but it may also have a detrimental effect on a student’s 
professional development.  This is because the student knows that 
while he is currently arguing one side in a round, by the next round he 
can only prevail by defeating the argument he is now making.  
Kozinski worries that the result of this is that “[t]he bond between 
lawyer and client, which is the essence of first-rate advocacy, is lost.  
This is an attitude that, if carried forward in practice, can have dire 
consequences. . . . [A] moot court graduate may approach real-life 
clients with the same degree of detachment.”76 
But Mercier and Sperber’s work suggests some responses to Judge 
Kozinski.  First, the reasoning skills developed in law school are not 
intended to be used by a hermit on a mountain seeking legal truth.  
Rather, consistent with Mercier and Sperber’s thesis, a law student 
learns that he is specifically developing skills to be used in practicing 
advocacy—skills intended to win arguments.  Just as courts do not 
issue advisory opinions, lawyers do not make arguments purely for 
the sake of making arguments.  Lawyers construct reasoned 
arguments solely to win cases. 
How does a law student develop this skill?  Recall the study 
Mercier and Sperber cited where the subject was asked to present his 
views on a subject such as “What are the causes of school failure?”77  
The devisers of the study were critical of the failure of the subjects to 
anticipate counterarguments.  The devisers concluded that the 
subjects exhibited flawed reasoning.  Yet Mercier and Sperber 
countered that the study itself was flawed because no one challenged 
the views of the subjects.  They cited other studies showing that 
people are best at rebutting contrary arguments when they are directly 
challenged by others.78 
Thus, to ask a law student to prepare the arguments for one side as 
if she were representing a client may not be the most effective way to 
encourage her to prepare for counterarguments and rebuttals.  Mercier 
and Sperber contend that people generate better arguments when 
engaged in a real debate.  When moot court students are forced to 
argue both sides, they are being forced not only to anticipate 
counterarguments from the other side; they are also forced to actually 
experience the case from the other side of the dispute. 
 
76 Id. at 186. 
77 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
78 Id. 
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By arguing both sides, moot court participants learn an important 
lesson.  Students see that legal disputes can support a cogent 
argument on each side.  The legal reasoning skills students learn in 
order to practice law should make students appreciate that many legal 
disputes are such that a good argument can be mounted by each side 
of the dispute.  The advocate’s role is simply to support her client’s 
position through legal reasoning in the most effective (and ethical) 
way possible. 
Moot court participants learn that “there are two sides to every 
issue” is more than a cliché; their own experience teaches them that it 
is a fact.  This should make them agree with Mercier and Sperber: the 
tools of reasoning are not meant to discover absolute truth but rather 
to convince others that they represent the better side. 
CONCLUSION 
Dan Kahan expressed it well when he noted that “[j]udicial 
opinions are notoriously—even comically—unequivocal.”79  Mercier 
and Sperber’s work should provide lawyers and judges with some 
needed perspective.  Lawyers are advocates, not philosophers.  
Lawyers use reasoning skills not to discover truth but rather to present 
the strongest possible arguments to support their clients.  Likewise, 
judges are not philosophers but arbiters.  Judges use reasoning skills 
to evaluate arguments and to explain why the results they have settled 
on are the fairer results. 
So where is truth in law?  Perhaps William James said it best over 
a century ago: “The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent 
in it.  Truth happens to an idea.  It becomes true, is made true by 
events.”80  Lawyers and judges do not discover truth; on the contrary, 
they use their professional skills to create it. 
 
79 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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